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A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION: INEFFICIENCY OF CAPITAL
INTERMEDIATION IN A DEREGULATED SYSTEM
WALLACE C. TURBEVILLE ∗
ABSTRACT
The evaluation of the costs and benefits of limiting human activity
through regulation is at the core of our government. When the activity that would be restricted is commercial, many have a bias against
regulation. They assume that restricting activity reduces productivity in the economy to the detriment of wealth creation. When a politician says that a rule is “unduly burdensome,” he or she means that
the discernible benefits do not outweigh the wealth that would be created if the rule did not exist. Today, the most sophisticated and
powerful articulation of this point of view concerns the regulation of
the financial markets through financial markets reform under existing and potential future legislation.
This Article describes how this debate suffers from preconceptions
that rely on unfounded economic theory and misconceptions based
on the sheer complexity of modern finance.
It identifies the first step: defining how to measure the value to society of a market structure that is bounded by a given set of regulations. The primary function of financial markets in this context is
the intermediation of capital investment. Efficiency can be measured
by cost. If the economic rent extracted by the financial sector for facilitating capital intermediation in a market construct is proportionate to the value added by this activity, efficiency of the market
structure is demonstrated.
This Article postulates that this has not been the case in recent
years. In doing so, it rejects the predominant approach to measuring
efficiency that emphasizes the cost of individual financial transac-
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tions. The predominant approach implicitly assumes that capital
intermediation can be viewed as a linear path of a unit of investment from an investor to a productive use. In this view, the costs of
individual transactions along the way determine the cost of the capital intermediation process.
This Article makes the case that this is naïve or intentionally misleading. Modern capital and derivatives markets are exceedingly
complex and involve multiple methods for extraction of value by the
financial sector that must be paid for by the productive economy.
This Article postulates that the amount extracted is demonstrably far
higher than historic data and reasoned analysis suggest could possibly be reasonable. Therefore, the rents extracted by the financial sector for intermediating capital investment are inefficiently high.
Finally, this Article asserts that the costs and benefits of financial
market regulation should not be biased by the assumption that the
restriction of activities is a burden that must be offset by legitimate
benefits such as safety and soundness of the system or even price
transparency. Under the proposed approach, regulations that reduce
complexity or market power do not by definition burden the financial
system in providing its essential social function but very likely en1
hance the efficiency of that process.
INTRODUCTION
The debate that rages over regulations in the United States represents a long struggle to define the optimal role of government in
society. The debaters question what behaviors should be permitted or
forbidden and what yardstick should be used to answer these questions. Regulation of commercial activity impacts the economic performance of the country and directly affects prosperity.
Financial reform responsive to the financial crisis of 2008 and its
role in the Great Recession is an important venue for that debate.
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was historic in its breadth and the scale
2
of its changes. Implementation of its provisions requires the promulgation of 236 separate rules, fewer than half of which have been
completed as of this writing, more than two and a half years after en-

1. This Article is adapted from Wallace C. Turbeville, Cracks in the Pipeline: Restoring
Efficiency to Wall Street and Value to Main Street, DEMOS (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.demos.org/publication/cracks-pipeline-restoring-efficiency-wall-street-andvalue-main-street.
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C.).

2013]

COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION

1175

3

actment. Dodd-Frank is very different from the New Deal’s financial
regulation, largely because of the complexity of today’s financial markets. It identifies some activities that are prohibited as unacceptably
risky. For example, insured banks are prohibited from engaging in
4
many types of proprietary trading activities under the “Volcker Rule.”
But, overwhelmingly, Dodd-Frank improves existing markets rather
than changes them fundamentally, focusing on transparency (limiting
the over-the-counter trading of derivatives); the upgrade of risk management procedures (required clearing of many derivatives, capital
and margin requirements, and post-trade data reporting for financial
firms); and oversight by prudential regulators (standards for the
amounts and adequacy of bank capital and required living wills to resolve failed institutions).
Regulation of the financial markets establishes boundaries within
which these markets allocate capital to productive uses. In this way,
Dodd-Frank’s influence on the shape of the economy is strong. In
crafting the law, Congress implicitly weighed the costs and benefits of
adopting the market structure that results from Dodd-Frank against
5
alternatives, including the alternative of doing nothing. The agencies responsible for crafting implementing regulations are legally required to take this weighing of costs and benefits to the next level of
detail, often by explicit statutory provisions.
As the agencies complete their work on the implementing rules,
the next phase of the battle between the Goliath of the bank lobbyists
and the David of the reform community will take place in the courts,
particularly in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. The first skirmish involved the Securities and Exchange
6
Commission’s Proxy Access rules. The D.C. Circuit found the SEC’s
7
“cost/benefit” analysis to be inadequate. This murky issue of costs
and benefits promises to be the target of judicial review of all important financial reform rules.
While the courts consider the financial reform regulations, Congress continues the weighing process. Those expressing concern over
“burdensome” regulation are proposing to limit the Dodd-Frank legis3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 13-195, REGULATORS HAVE FACED
CHALLENGES FINALIZING KEY REFORMS AND UNADDRESSED AREAS POSE POTENTIAL RISKS
(2013).
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376, § 619 (2010) (Volcker Rule to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4)).
5. Id.
6. Bus. Roundtable & Chamber of Commerce v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. 10-1305
(D.C. Cir. filed July 22, 2011).
7. Id.
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lation, while others advocate broadening the scope of the law. In
both cases, the proponents are dissatisfied with the balance of costs
and benefits in the structure of the financial markets.
From its inception, this debate over the best financial market
structure in the post-financial-crisis world has avoided some basic
questions. Ground rules for measuring costs and benefits have been
elusive and methodologies have been inconsistent. As a result, a
troubling assumption has lurked in the background. There is general
consensus that a recurrence of the consequences of the near collapse
of the financial system in 2008 must be prevented. But it is also fundamentally assumed that constraining the financial markets will impede economic productivity. Financial market regulation, therefore,
is considered to be an inherently costly undertaking where the benefits (such as reducing the risk of financial crises) perhaps make it
worthwhile.
The regime established by Dodd-Frank understandably gave priority to risk mitigation in response to the actual events of 2008. Massive risk is an element of the modern financial system. But risk and
reward are generally symmetrical. An economy disproportionately
skewed toward rewarding the financial sector raises important structural issues that have yet to be addressed by laws and regulations. The
first step is to erase the preconception that regulations burden the efficient functioning of a market and that the good that regulations do
must outweigh this burden.
This Article will demonstrate that the concept of definitionally
efficient unregulated trading markets is fundamentally flawed. At its
core, it is based on an incorrect measure of efficiency which leads analysts to look in the wrong places when measuring frictions embedded
in market structures and behaviors. In the current discourse, efficiency is almost uniformly measured by referencing the cost of individual transactions. But the principal social value of financial markets
is not to assure the lowest transaction costs for market participants.
Rather, it is to facilitate the efficient deployment of funds held by investors to productive uses. In other words, markets are efficient if the
cost to the entity putting capital to work productively is as close as
possible to the price demanded by the entity that seeks a return on its
investment, both measured comprehensively. The entire difference
8. See, e.g., H.R. 1062, 112th Cong. (2012) (proposing the “Burdensome Data Collection Relief Act”).
9. Letter from Rep. Keith Ellison to Ben Bernanke and Timothy Geithner (Sept. 24,
2009), available at http://ellison.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/2009/Letter_to_
Bernanke_and_Geithner.pdf.
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between the two is attributable to the plumbing that connects capital
sources to capital uses, known as intermediation. The economic
10
rents extracted by intermediaries must be as low as possible to compensate them for performing the essential intermediation service if
the system is to work efficiently.
Almost universally, this concept is lost in the discussion of financial markets. Efficiency is expressed in terms of the cost of a securities
or derivatives transaction. This measures how well the markets work
for traders. But it is only one element of the cost of intermediation
between capital sources and uses. For reasons ranging from ideology
to analytic sloth, the possibility that a market with low transaction
costs can also be one in which intermediation costs are inefficiently
high is ignored in public debate and academic analysis. As the courts
begin to review cost/benefit analysis for the massive number of rules
promulgated by the regulatory agencies, it is important that they be
directed to properly measured costs and benefits.
Properly measured, the financial markets have become less efficient in the era of deregulation even though conventional wisdom
dictates that advances in information technology and quantitative
analysis should have caused the opposite result. Enormous sums of
money are extracted from the capital intermediation process causing
the financial sector share of the economy to grow at the expense of
the productive manufacturing and service sectors and public finance.
This trend must be reversed if the U.S. economy is to prosper and
compete successfully in the world markets.
Several factors contribute to this result. Contrary to commonly
held beliefs, advances in information technology and quantitative
analysis have actually created asymmetries in information among trading market participants. While up-to-date information related to fundamental value (for example, corporate financial reports, crop yields,
11
government policies) is widely known today, these advances have
been used by the more sophisticated and better-funded market participants to detect, analyze, and often influence activities by other mar10. A measure of market power, economic rent is the value in excess of marginal costs
extracted by market participants. See Economic A to Z Terms, ECONOMIST, available at
http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/r#node-21529784 (last visited June 21,
2013).
11. Fundamental value refers to the intrinsic value of a stock, bond, or derivative
based on available information. In the context of a share of stock, “Fundamental analysis
entails the use of information in current and past financial statements, in conjunction with
industry and macroeconomic data to arrive at a firm’s intrinsic value.” S.P. Kothari, Capital
Markets Research in Accounting (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=235798.
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ket participants, and to then exploit advantages derived from this
12
In addition, complex inmarket non-fundamental information.
struments—primarily derivatives—are better understood by the financial institutions that market them than by their customers. As a result,
the financial institutions profit far more from the sale of these instruments than their customers realize.
These two types of information advantage (and others) are systematically used to increase economic rents extracted from the intermediation process. Changes in both the law governing banks and
the underlying structure of the financial markets have allowed banks
to exploit this informational advantage through capital intermedia13
tion. The abandonment of the Glass-Steagall Act, which gave rise to
multifunctional universal banks, as well as the elimination of several
large banks during the financial crisis, led to dramatic consolidation
14
in the financial service industry. The financial sector is now dominated by a small number of large banks that enjoy tremendous market
15
power. Because of powerful shared interests in the structure and
16
process of the markets, these banks act as an oligopoly. Concentrated market power allows the oligopoly to use its information advantages and massive capital to extract value from the intermediation
process on a large scale. Dominant financial institutions systematically create market distortions and then exploit those distortions.
Changes in the financial markets have similarly increased opportunities for capital intermediation. The growth of pooled investment vehicles, from pension funds to hedge funds to money market mutual
17
funds and others, has changed the process of capital intermediation.
Much of the money that historically funded bank deposits has migrated to those vehicles. The bank lending model for intermediation—
12. The information asymmetry discussed in this Article is very different from the
fundamental information inefficiencies addressed in a number of studies that examine the
differing motivations of market participants. For an excellent analysis of such fundamental information inefficiencies, see David A. Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing,
56 J. FIN. 1533 (2001); Lynn Stout, Inefficient Markets and the New Finance, J. FIN. TRANS.
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=729224.
13. Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
14. Sergei M. Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, Imperfect Competition in Financial Markets and
Capital Structure (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=603721.
15. See COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, OCC’S QUARTERLY
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES FOURTH QUARTER (2010).
16. For an analysis of the post-Glass-Steagall oligopolistic behavior of banks in the debt
and equity markets, see Guriev & Kvasov, supra note 14.
17. See WILLIAM H. DONALDSON, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS (2003) (discussing the rise of pooled investment vehicles like
hedge funds).
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where depository banks move funds held as customer savings into capital investments—has been largely replaced by a trading market intermediation model. In most cases, managers of pooled funds are
judged by comparing transaction results with overall short-term mar18
ket results rather than by long-term results. The driving goal is to
beat the market rather than to produce long-term results. Since longterm results are not emphasized, efficient intermediation between
19
capital sources and uses is less valued by investors. This obscures inefficiencies from both the investors and consumers of capital who
could discipline the system to increase efficiency if performance were
measured by giving greater consideration to long-term growth of value. It enables the extraction of value from the capital intermediation
process by financial institutions.
The consequences of extraction of value from capital intermediation by the dominant financial institutions reach far beyond unfairness among market participants. Inefficient capital intermediation
exacts wide-ranging costs that severely burden the economy by restricting the flow of capital to consumers, increasing the cost of consumer goods, increasing the costs of productive projects, slowing job
creation, and reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy. Inefficient capital intermediation also reduces the self-correcting effect of
supply and demand and excessively diverts wealth to the financial sector. The net effects of these costs are widely apparent: lower productivity, more expensive goods, and fewer jobs.
In recent years, the financial sector share of aggregate gross domestic product (“GDP”) has been in the range of 8.3%, an increase
20
from the historic level of 4.1%. By inferring that the historical increase in financial sector share of GDP is attributable to the value diverted from capital intermediation, the excessive wealth transfer to
the financial sector is in the range of $635 billion per year.
These market inefficiencies also increase the likelihood that financial crises, like the 2008 financial crisis, will recur. Exploitation of
market distortions is the root cause of the most recent financial crisis.
Market participants with enormous market power are incentivized to
increase the complexity of markets and to take excessive risks to reap

18. Robin M. Greenwood & David S. Scharfstein, The Growth of Modern Finance (July 1,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2162179.
19. Id.
20. Justin Lahart, Number of the Week: Finance’s Share of Economy Continues to Grow, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2011), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/12/10/numberof-the-week-finances-share-of-economy-continues-to-grow/.
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short-term gain, often by generating asset or debt bubbles. Financial
crises can be triggered by bursting price bubbles.
If these root causes are not addressed by regulatory reforms, future financial crises are inevitable. After all, the banks themselves
could have restrained their behavior prior to the crisis even if regulations did not. It should be obvious to all that the incentives to the
banks in terms of outsized corporate profits must be immense to induce behavior that put the bank at mortal risk. The lure of immediate profits from the exercise of market power was simply too strong to
allow rational prudence to prevail.
I. UNDERPINNING OF THE GREAT DEREGULATION EXPERIMENT
Commencing with President Reagan’s election in 1980, the financial markets in the United States were totally transformed by three
major developments: (1) advances in quantitative measurement of
dynamic market price movements and information technology; (2)
concentration of market power into a few large financial institutions;
and (3) deregulation.
The first development was the ability to quantify the future risks
21
embedded in the market, apart from changes in fundamental value.
Instead of looking at economic data and financial statements, which
are components in today’s price, traders could determine the statistical probability of price moves going forward. They could ascribe a
value to future price volatility and detach it from the underlying security or commodity. This was a precondition to the changes of the last
three decades, and was essential to the rapid emergence of the $60
trillion per year derivatives market, a market that barely existed be22
fore the 1990s.
Advances in information technology allowed near-real time valuation of dynamic price movements and deployment of capital at high
speeds to exploit this capability. Previously, trading took place most
often by telephone and was driven primarily by broad-based information relevant to macro-economic data and information relevant to
the fundamental value of specific securities and commodities. Trading floors are now dominated by arrays of screens at every trader’s
21. For a definition of fundamental value, see supra note 10.
22. Derivatives are contracts that obligate payment of cash based on asset market price
movements. The advent of derivatives allowed traders to detach price movement risk from
assets and the Black-Scholes model allowed the resulting instruments to be valued. See
Wallace C. Turbeville, Derivatives: Innovation in the Era of Financial Regulation, DEMOS (June
13,
2013),
http://www.demos.org/publication/derivatives-innovation-era-financialregulation (discussing the history of and theory behind the Black-Scholes model).
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desk, most tied directly to trading venues enabling instantaneous execution of trades. Trading was transformed into an electronic business
of massive volumes and complex strategies intended to profit from
dynamic price movement rather than simple investment in assets
based on their fundamental value. Furthermore, the critically important regulatory framework that had defined the markets since the
New Deal was utterly dismantled to remove all impediments to the
new trading business.
Commercial banking (taking deposits and making loans) had
been separated from investment banking (proprietary trading of securities and commodities) since the adoption of the Glass-Steagall Act
23
in 1933. Banks that took in deposits and made loans were prohibit24
ed from trading securities and commodities. Throughout the 1980s
and 1990s, regulators repeatedly undermined the separation of commercial and investment banking. The law was finally repealed in 1999
25
by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. All banks could now trade for their
own account and the race was on to accumulate vast stockpiles of financial assets to increase the market power generated by marrying-up
26
trading with the huge resources of depository banks. It was now the
era of the so-called “universal bank” that could both take deposits and
make loans and trade the financial markets.
As repeal of Glass-Steagall approached, investment banking and
commercial banking began a period of dramatic consolidation. After
its repeal, large commercial banks became universal banks through
acquisition of investment banks or by launching new trading opera23. Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933); see also Stephen P. Kenkel, Banking and Securities Law, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 736, 736 (1998) (“In passing the
Glass-Steagall Act (Glass-Steagall or the Act), Congress attempted to separate commercial
and investment banking.”).
24. See Kenkel, supra note 23, at 738 (“Section 16 [of the Glass-Steagall Act] restricts
the securities activities of Federal Reserve member banks ‘to purchasing and selling such
securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account, of customers. . . .’ Section 20 bars member banks from ‘affiliating’ with organizations ‘engaged
principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution . . . of stocks,
bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities.’ Section 21 prohibits any organization engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities from accepting deposits. Finally, Section 32 prohibits the existence of interlocking management
between member banks and firms engaged in the securities business.”).
25. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 219
(2002) (“The GLB Act removed legal restrictions on affiliations between banks and securities firms by repealing two provisions of a 1933 statute popularly known as the ‘GlassSteagall Act.’”).
26. See id. (“As a result of the GLB Act, banks can combine with securities firms and
insurance companies to organize financial conglomerates under the structure of a ‘financial holding company.’”).
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tions. Finally, during the crisis, Bear Stearns was scooped up by JP
Morgan Chase and Bank of America absorbed Merrill Lynch, both
with the direct involvement of the government. Weeks later, Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs converted to banks to steady themselves
in the turmoil. Investment banks, other than regional and boutique
investment banks, ceased to exist as a separate category from commercial banks.
The consolidation was widespread, resulting in a system of mega27
banks, an oligopoly with vast market power. While there is no available comprehensive study of oligopoly behavior in the trading markets,
the banks engage in specific trading activities that are consistent with
this behavior. And one need only consider the reports of the investigation into the manipulation of the London Inter-bank Offered Rate
28
(“LIBOR”) as an example of this behavior.
Recent research by the Dallas Fed provides a window on this pro29
cess. The study observes that in 1970 the top five banks in terms of
assets held 17% of aggregate bank assets. By 2010, the top five banks
30
held 52% of aggregate assets.
In parallel, the newly created derivatives market was exempted
from all meaningful regulation in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Derivatives, dubbed by Warren Buffet as “financial
31
instruments of mass destruction,” were to be unregulated, creating a
new, massively risky market overnight. Universal banks were handed
an opportunity to dominate another trading market, one perfectly designed for their information and quantitative advantages—the four
largest banks currently control 94% of the bank derivatives business in
32
the United States.
27. See Guriev & Kvasov, supra note 14 (analyzing the post Glass-Steagall oligopolistic
behavior of banks in the debt and equity markets).
28. Reed Albergotti & Jean Eaglesham, 9 More Banks Subpoenaed over LIBOR, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 25, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702038974045
78079413742864842.html. The breadth of the investigation suggests that many large
banks were aware of the practice and simply joined in to secure their share of the profits, a
concerted effort by the large universal banks to manipulate a system affecting a broad
swath of the public.
29. FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALL., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT: CHOOSING THE ROAD TO
PROSPERITY (2011).
30. Id.
31. WARREN BUFFET, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY ANNUAL REPORT: LETTER TO
SHAREHOLDERS 15 (2002), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar
.pdf.
32. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES—FIRST QUARTER 2012 (2012), available at
http://occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/derivativesquarterly-report.html.
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE FINANCIAL MARKET SYSTEM
There is a common understanding that financial markets work by
constantly finding an equilibrium that is defined by fundamental value. If the markets are large enough and if the information relevant to
fundamental value is equally accessible, prices of securities and commodities will be forced toward the theoretically correct levels by competition among traders. Since all participants are equally motivated
by greed, high transaction volume will quickly erase any price anomaly or inefficiency. Individual greed will be canceled out by universal
greed.
The foundation for this way of thinking is the efficient market
33
34
hypothesis, whose most famous devotee is Alan Greenspan. Under
the hypothesis, no regulation is the best regulation. This is completely simpatico with the conservative ideology of the Reagan administration and its successors. It became the foundation of pre-financial crisis policy on financial regulation.
A corollary to the efficient market hypothesis is the representa35
tive agent model. If price anomalies and inefficiencies are instantaneously eradicated, individual motivations and quirks of market struc36
tures are irrelevant. The marketplace can be viewed as monolithic
for purposes of analysis. Academic and other experts adopted this
model and systematically de-emphasized factors other than the com37
mon interest in optimizing market value. Having adopted the representative agent model, academic research ignored the potential for a
system dominated by the exploitation of distortions often created by
individual agents.
The representative agent model affects the approach to regulation dramatically. Certainly, bad behavior can be proscribed, such as
fraud or market manipulation. But the representative agent model
causes the rule makers to set standards that require greater culpability
as a precondition to rule violation. If trading activity in pursuit of
greed is good, no one activity should be singled out unless it is heinous in the extreme. This is an institutional reason that so few partic-

33. The hypothesis was originally articulated by University of Chicago economist Eugene Fama in 1970. Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 2 (1970).
34. Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics (Princeton Univ.,
CEPS Working Paper No. 91, 2003).
35. RAGHURAM RAJAN, FAULT LINES 116 (2010).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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ipants in the financial market debacle have been taken to task in legal
proceedings.
History has not been kind to the efficient market hypothesis. As
Greenspan famously observed, the events of the financial crisis could
38
not have existed under such a market cosmology. Instead, the mar39
ket was riddled with misinformation and conflicts of interest. Market participants did not act to preserve the integrity of the market as
40
They acted to maximize short-term
predicted by the hypothesis.
profits (and their bonuses) until the music finally stopped, precipitat41
Contrary to the representative agent
ing bankruptcy or bailout.
model, the pursuit of narrow interests determined outcomes. Market
participants were not monolithic at all. Their actual behavior resembled the lifeboat evacuation of the Titanic, with similar inefficient
consequences.
The economic model that better fits with the events of the recent
past is that of economist Hyman Minsky: “[O]nce we admit that institutions are man-made and at least in part the product of conscious
decision, we must also face the effects of institutional arrangements
42
on social results.” He argues “that almost all systems which are multidimensional, nonlinear, and time dependent are endogenously un43
stable.” In Minsky’s view, periods of market stability are destabilizing
and markets are inescapably incoherent. Markets are not predictably
efficient. They are similar to a fluid system influenced by multiple
forces that are difficult to either predict or measure. A price can be
formed in a market, but contemplation of its perfection is a futile
task.
Today’s markets are far more consistent with Minsky’s theories.
While some information is broadly shared by market participants (the
essential assumption of the efficient market hypothesis), the everincreasing speed and capacity of information technology assures that
the more powerful market participants will always enjoy an information advantage. Especially in modern, high-speed markets, the
perception of facts is the driving force. Perceptions can be altered.
38. Bryan Knowlton & Michael M. Grynbaum, Greenspan “Shocked” That Free Markets Are
Flawed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/
business/worldbusiness/23iht-gspan.4.17206624.html.
39. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY &
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, MAJORITY AND MINORITY STAFF REPORT, WALL
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE (2011).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. HYMAN MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 9 (2008).
43. Id. at 11 n.9.
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Altered perceptions of current circumstances created by information
asymmetries, even for small periods of time, can introduce tremendous distortions.
This reality undermines the concept that markets behave like
natural systems in equilibrium. Thus, other system concepts must explain them better. Fluid systems, described by chaos theory, are not
good comparisons. The basic principle of chaos theory is that future
outcomes cannot be predicted even if one has all relevant information about current conditions. In financial markets, cause and effect is relatively clear. It is, however, difficult to know when the effect
may occur and whether it will happen at a single time or in stages.
There is a third possibility: self-organized criticality. This system
construct was articulated by the physicist Per Bak and likens natural
44
systems to tectonic plates. It is entirely predictable that earthquakes
will occur, but it appears to be impossible to forecast when and in
what stages the forces built up by plate movements will be released.
The example provided by Professor Bak is a child dribbling sand into
45
a pile at the beach. At first the size and shape of the pile is predicta46
ble. As the pile accretes, however, it will reach a point of criticality
47
that results in an avalanche. How and when this occurs depends on
the complexity of the system, that is to say the irregularity of the
grains of sand that hold the pile together by friction as forces accumu48
late only to be released in the avalanche. If the system were less
complex, for instance if the particles were smooth like marbles, the
force would not accumulate but would be released constantly.
Self-organized criticality aptly describes modern financial markets. The markets are characterized by booms (mortgages, dot-com
stocks) and busts (financial crisis). This is very different from a system in constant equilibrium.
The application of Professor Bak’s construct has extraordinary
implications for evaluating the costs and benefits of regulation. It
suggests how regulation should best be crafted to shape markets that
efficiently price and deploy capita. Self-organized criticality derives
from the complexity of the system. Thus reducing complexity has
value in and of itself by mitigating the violence of the type of avalanche that we call a financial crisis. Instead of shying away from di44.
(1999).
45.
46.
47.
48.

PER BAK, HOW NATURE WORKS: THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY 1–3
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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rectly restricting transactions that create complexity, it should be a
goal.
III. PERFORMANCE OF THE DEREGULATED MARKETS
If deregulated financial markets can best be described by selforganized criticality, complexity might still be a benefit to the economy if the markets are performing their social functions more efficiently than they might otherwise. One need only compare the increased
financial sector compensation levels that accompanied deregulation
with the persistent unemployment that follows recessions and income
49
and wealth disparity to see that they are not. In the referenced article, I describe connections between deregulation and profits and
their share of the economy.
It is not simply that the financial sector has been extremely profitable, though it has been. During the thirty-five years of deregulation, the financial sector share of the economy has increased to un50
precedented levels, growing from 3.8% to 8.2% of the GDP, while
the manufacturing and services sectors have become relatively smaller. The trend is not caused by exporting financial services to foreign
51
nations. Instead, the modern financial services sector is profiting by
extracting the value that it delivers to the rest of the U.S. economy.
This phenomenon is structural.
Aside from insurance and payment systems, the essential service
52
of the financial sector is capital intermediation. Sources of capital,
such as savings and pension funds, must be matched up with users of
53
capital who are financing productive activities. The overwhelming
value that is extracted by the financial sector, which relates to its profitability and share of GDP, is extracted from capital intermediation in
54
various forms. The efficiency of the matching systems is a function
of fundamental capital cost and the cost of intermediation. The price
49. See Turbeville, supra note 1 (describing connections between deregulation and
increased financial sector compensation levels, profits, and share of the economy and
pointing out connections between these phenomena and persistent unemployment following recessions).
50. Thomas Philippon, The Future of the Financial Industry, STERN ON FIN. (Oct. 16,
2008),
http://sternfinance.blogspot.com/2008/10/future-of-financial-industry-thomas.
html.
51. Turbeville, supra note 1.
52. Thomas Philippon, The Size of the U.S. Finance Industry: a Puzzle? (Fed. Reserve Bank
of N.Y., N.Y. Area Monetary Policy Workshop Paper, 2011), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/conference/2011/NYAMP/Fed_Philippon_v1.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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paid for intermediation must be rationally related to the service provided. In terms used by economists, the economic rent extracted for
capital intermediation must be optimally small.
A recent study of intermediation costs by Thomas Philippon of
New York University’s Stern School of Management addressed the
55
causes of the current large financial sector share of the economy.
Professor Philippon used the neoclassical growth model to examine
financial intermediation in the United States over a 140-year period.
He constructed an index that measures the unit cost of financial intermediation to show that the finance industry has become less effi56
cient in providing intermediation services over time. He summarized his findings as follows:
[T]he finance cost index has increased since the mid-1970s.
This is counter-intuitive. If anything, the development of information technologies (IT) over the past 40 years should
have disproportionately increased efficiency in the finance
industry. How is it possible for today’s finance industry not
to be significantly more efficient than the finance industry of
John Pierpont Morgan a century ago? [The historic trends]
57
present[] a puzzle for future research.
Finance has obviously benefited from the IT revolution, which
has dramatically lowered the cost of retail finance. Yet, even when accounting for all the financial assets created in the United States, the
cost of intermediation appears to have increased. Why is the nonfinancial sector transferring so much income to the financial sector?
Professor Philippon concludes that, mechanically, the reason is an
58
enormous increase in trading.
The study indicates that the cost of intermediation between the
suppliers of capital and the productive consumers of capital has increased notwithstanding technology advances, sophisticated quantitative analysis, massive trading volume increases, and diversity in securi59
ties and derivatives markets.
The only time over the 140-year period that Professor Philippon’s
financial intermediation cost index was comparable to the period of
55. Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory
and Management of Financial Intermediation (May 2012) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Philippon, Less Efficient?], available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/papers/
Finance_Efficiency.pdf.
56. Id. at 16–17.
57. Id. at 15–17.
58. Id. at 22.
59. Id. at 21 tbl.11.
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60

deregulation was the Great Depression. High costs of intermediation make sense in the Great Depression when intermediation virtually ceased to exist—there was even a bank holiday for a period. But in
the deregulation period, banks were profitable and the supply of financing was plentiful. Reasoning under the tenets of the efficient
market hypothesis, the professor correctly concludes that this is absolutely counter-intuitive. But from the perspective of an observer of
trading behavior and market evolution, his results make perfect sense.
Thinking of the financial markets in the context of self-organized
criticality allows us to see behind Professor Philippon’s reference to
61
“an enormous increase in trading.” Complexity is the key to understanding the massive inefficiency of capital intermediation and increased volume is merely a byproduct of increased complexity.
By understanding how complexity fuels inefficiency we can better
understand why the financial sector has incentives to increase complexity and why this leads to financial crises. Asymmetric information
allows those market participants with better information to consistent62
ly earn more from trading than others. Complexity allows more effective deployment of information asymmetry advantages since the
available information is more difficult to discern and analyze.
The remainder of this Article examines real world applications of
asymmetry. First, it looks at high frequency trading, which is driven
by information technology. It then examines derivatives, which involve advanced quantitative analysis. These examples of the two forms
of information asymmetry are by no means exclusive, but they are the
most visible. Regulations that limit these two activities should not be
seen as burdening marked efficiency. In contrast, such regulations
should be assumed to increase efficiency of capital intermediation.
IV. HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING (“HFT”)
If asked to describe the role of a financial market structure, a
trading professional will virtually always say that it is to facilitate liquidity so that transactions can be accomplished efficiently and at a
low cost. This makes sense because the compensation of traders and
fund managers is related to transaction costs.
Properly used, efficient liquidity for a given transaction refers to
market conditions needed so that initiation of the transaction will
not, by itself, alter the best available transaction price. If, for exam60. Id.
61. Id. at 19–21.
62. See supra Part II.
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ple, a large number of willing buyers are active in a market, a seller is
more likely to receive the highest going price for a sale he posts to the
marketplace seeking a bid. There is depth in the buying interest at
the best going price that is sufficient to absorb the sale.
A large number of transactions taking place in a market generally
means that transaction liquidity will be high and the seller is more
likely to receive the price most recently bid to other sellers when his
posted offer to sell is matched with a buyer. This assumes that high
volume information traders, those whose strategy is to enter and exit
the market quickly to take advantage of superior information, are
consistently willing to transact at the going market prices and provide
liquidity. In the modern markets, most information traders employ
powerful computers driven by algorithms that can switch from providing liquidity to liquidity consumption instantaneously.
During any observation period, the price paid by capital consumers should be greater than the price received by capital investors.
Traders must be compensated for intermediation, after all. It is often
assumed that when the spread between the prices at which traders can
buy and sell is as low as it can be, intermediation is efficient. Capital
63
intermediation is relatively inefficient. If the enormous increase in
volume of trading in today’s market represented by HFT is providing
liquidity and lowering that spread, how can intermediation be inefficient?
High frequency trading has been defined as “fully automated
trading strategies with very high trading volume and extremely short
holding periods ranging from milliseconds to minutes and possibly
64
hours.” At the speed of HFT transaction execution, no human decision-making is possible. The decisions are driven by algorithms that
dictate the placement of orders and purchases or sales based on observed market conditions. A computer-driven trading operation enslaved to an algorithm is like a “trader-bot,” intended to act just like a
human trader but at high speed. As we shall see, this intent cannot be
fulfilled because the flexibility of algorithms is limited.
High frequency trading is pervasive, especially in the equities
markets where it has been estimated that it represents 73% of all vol65
ume. It has changed fundamental characteristics of markets. At the
end of World War II, the average holding period for stocks was four
63. See Philippon, Less Efficient?, supra note 55, at 16–17.
64. Frank Zhang, High Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility, and Price Discovery (Dec. 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1691679.
65. R. IATI, TABB GRP., HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING TECHNOLOGY (2009).
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years. By the turn of the millennium, it was eight months. By 2008,
the average holding period declined to two months. And by 2011, it
has been estimated that, at least for actively traded stocks, it had de66
clined to twenty-two seconds.
While there has been speculation that high frequency trading
may have declined recently, a November 2012 study funded by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission focusing on HFT profitability in the equities futures market, an integral element of the equities
market, finds that the percentage share of HFT in that sector has re67
mained constant. High frequency trading is the dominant form of
information trader activity and a likely source of value extraction from
the capital intermediation process.
The inquiry into the flash crash of May 2010 resulted in a study
of market dynamics during that event by Andrei Kirilenko, the chief
economist of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and oth68
ers. On May 6, 2010, the Dow Jones Average plunged over 1000
69
points in a matter of minutes. This represented approximately $1
70
trillion of market value. The culprit most cited was a mutual fund
whose algorithms governing trading tactics triggered a $4 billion sale
of equity instruments, on a day when the market was particularly
71
shaky, with insufficient regard to price. The market soon recovered,
72
but the mayhem caused by the rapid moves was substantial. Fortunately, the flash crash occurred in the early afternoon allowing time
for the market to recover.

66. Paul Jay, Interview with Michael Hudson, REAL NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 1, 2011),
http://www.therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Item
id=74&jumival=6000#.UQVySejaicY. Jay spoke with Professor Hudson, a professor of economics at the University of Missouri—Kansas City regarding this estimate. He reported
that he had been told by a number of trading professionals that this was the case. He then
examined data from the New York Stock Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
and compared shares of actively traded stock outstanding with activity in those shares on
the exchanges. He concluded that the data were consistent with and reinforced the twenty-two second estimate. Id.
67. MATTHEW BARON, JONATHON BROGAARD & ANDREI KIRILENKO, NAT’L BUREAU OF
ECON. RESEARCH, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE MEETING, THE TRADING PROFITS OF HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADERS (2012), available at http://conference.nber.org/confer/2012/
MMf12/Baron_Brogaard_Kirilenko.pdf.
68. Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trading on an
Electronic Market (May 26, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686004.
69. David Easley et al., The Microstructure of the ‘Flash Crash,’ 37 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT.
118, 119 (2010).
70. Id.
71. Kirilenko et al., supra note 68, at 9.
72. Id. at 8.
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The Kirilenko study targeted the role of algorithmic, high frequency trading as it interacted with the initial aberrant price move
73
caused by the mutual fund. The study contrasted behavior of HFTs
and market makers, who, unlike information traders, profit in the
market from the spread between purchase prices and sale prices ra74
ther than price movement. The study showed that market makers
tended to moderate the price moves because they did not instantane75
ously exit the markets, dumping inventories on the way out. In contrast, HFTs, who seek to profit from price moves at high speed, exacerbated the flash crash by reacting, en masse, to price moves
automatically as their systems responded to unusual market moves in
76
ways dictated by their governing algorithms. Kirilenko has described
an “ecosystem of market participants” that interacted through algorithms and high-speed trading systems to create a serious stock mar77
ket anomaly.
The study demonstrates that there is a great distinction between
volume and market liquidity. For example, algorithmic trading activi78
ty can amplify the price effect of a given market event. Prior to an
event, market participants misperceive the volume generated by the
algorithmic traders as stabilizing liquidity. Yet the systems are rigged
to exit the market and dump inventories at the worst possible time, in
terms of stability. When an event occurs, the “stabilizing liquidity”
converts instantaneously into trading that consumes massive amounts
of liquidity. The perceived stabilizing liquidity is an illusion, an even
more disruptive circumstance than if the illusory stabilizing liquidity
had never existed at all.
The 2010 flash crash was a dramatic example of events that occur
79
daily in the markets. Mini-flash crashes distort markets repeatedly,
causing prices to be unreliable and volatile. A recent study likewise
found that high frequency trading is positively correlated with stock
price volatility, after controlling for fundamental volatility and other

73. Id. at 2–3.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 27.
76. Id. at 36.
77. Andrei Kirilenko, Presentation to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Technical Advisory Committee Roundtable (Oct. 12, 2010), available at http://capitol
connection.net/capcon/cftc/webcastarchive.htm#.
78. Kirilenko et al., supra note 68, at 36.
79. Graham Bowley, The Flash Crash, in Miniature, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2010, at B1.
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80

exogenous determinants.
The study identifies intra-day volatility
81
that is actually a series of mini-flash crashes.
The point is made eloquently by Eric Hunsader, the founder of
Nanex, a high speed market date feed service:
In summary, HFT algos reduce the value of resting orders
[for example, a market maker’s orders] and increase the
value of how fast orders can be placed and cancelled. This
results in the illusion of liquidity. We can’t understand why
this is allowed to continue, because at the core, it is pure
82
manipulation.
But what about the time periods in which HFTs are not exiting
the marketplace precipitously? After all, a number of studies have
83
concluded that HFT provides benefits. These studies, however, focus on lower individual transaction costs. It is reasonable to find a
benefit if the focus is narrowed to that level.
Another study focuses instead on the effect on the narrower class
84
of market participants who merely intend to make investments. This
class of traders is referred to as value investors. The study also discusses the effect on HFT on market makers and information traders
whose activities establish the spread between available purchase and
85
sale prices. The study characterizes the basic purpose of HFT as the
use of speed to insert the HFT trader in between value investors and
86
market makers. The idea is to buy from or sell to a value investor
and instantaneously sell to or buy from a market maker. The study
concludes that the prices paid or received by value investors are adversely affected because liquidity-providing market makers adjust their
87
price demands to compensate for the value extracted by HFTs.
80. Zhang, supra note 64, at 1. In other words, all volatility caused by factors other
than the HFT activity was filtered out and a strong correlation between HFT activity and
the remaining volatility was found to recur frequently in each trading day.
81. Id.
82. Enough Already!, NANEX (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.nanex.net/Research/
EMini2/EMini2.html. The statement was made in an article referencing a particular algorithm known as “The Disruptor” that is specifically intended to disrupt the stabilizing order behavior of a liquidity provider.
83. See, e.g., Terrence Hendershott & Ryan Riordan, Algorithmic Trading and Information, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 22), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001912.
84. Álvaro Cartea and José Penalva, Where Is the Value in High Frequency Trading? (Dec.
21, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1712765.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1.
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In other words, individual transaction costs are not increased but
absolute price levels are altered to the detriment of the value investors, especially large institutional investors that transact large positions. Since value investors make their decision to invest based on return on funds invested, prices must adjust to compensate for the lost
88
value.
Investors don’t merely buy a security and passively hold it. They
89
invest in the market price for the security over time. Further, they
periodically replace the security by selling and acquiring another security. Valuation of an investment security and its successive replace90
ments depends on the dynamic market price over time. The investors mark the position representing the successive securities to
91
current market prices daily. Each day, they make the decision to
hold the security or to replace it using these marks. When the investor allocates a sum of money to investment, he is investing in a series
of daily transactions, including the decision to hold the security, that
are affected by the changing fundamental value of the security and its
successors, but also by the market activities of others that affect daily
92
valuation via non-fundamental forces.
When a business or government issues debt or equity, the price it
receives is determined by the expected return required to induce investors to transact. If the expected return is uncertain, the price paid
by the investor must be lower to compensate for uncertainty. The return may be uncertain because the business or government is risky
from a fundamental value perspective, but it may also be uncertain
because of market unreliability. For example, if the market lacks reliable liquidity for the security, the ongoing value is subject to price risk
93
over and above fundamental value risk. Liquidity may not be sufficiently high to generate purchases and sales at the fundamentally
94
sound price over time. The cause is likely to be information trader
95
activity that consumes liquidity either consistently or periodically.

88. Id. at 45.
89. See, e.g., R. E. BAILEY, THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 5 (2005).
90. Id. at 9.
91. Id. at 5.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Stock and Bond Liquidity and Its Effect on Prices
and Financial Policies, 20 FIN. MARKETS & PORTFOLIO MGMT. 19, 21 (2006), available at
http://asaprinceton.com/images/meeting/101711/Amihud_and_Mendelson_/amihud_
and_mendelson2006.pdf.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Investment is not a structured process in which dollars can be
tagged and traced through a linear series of transactions. There is a
value extraction return premium attached to a security that is set by
value investors to offset the cost of future market disruption. When a
business or government raises money in the market, it pays that premium to the value investors. But the reason the value investors require the premium is that they know they must pay it back to information traders over time as a result of unreliable valuation prior to
and at the time the position is liquidated or replaced. The premium
ultimately is paid to HFTs as they extract value from the market on a
daily basis.
The best empirical evidence of this is probably the financial sector’s increased share of GDP and profits in the economy as a whole, as
described above. No sector of the economy is better suited to benefit
from advances in information technology and quantitative analysis.
Furthermore, the rise of mutual funds and other aggregated investment funds has increased the scale of investment activities. The financial sector should be able to perform the intermediation function
far more efficiently than in the past. On a transaction-by-transaction
basis, these advances have resulted in lower transaction spreads as
markets volumes have increased. Thus, the increased share of the
economy represented by the financial sector, occurring simultaneously with transaction efficiencies that have had the effect of reducing
the share, indicates that a substantial portion of market activity extracts value from the overall capital intermediation process.
In addition, the CFTC-sponsored study on profitability of HFTs
cited above demonstrates persistent and substantial profitability for
this large element of the trading market even though the risk taken
96
on to earn this profit is very small. Consistent profit, in excess of the
going spread between purchase and sale prices with very little risk,
means that the HFTs are extracting value based on structural, rather
than fundamental, information. There is simply no other way that
these conditions could co-exist. The HFTs are reaping the value extraction return premium that they caused to exist. And the persistent
large profit that is disproportionate to risk means that the value extracted far exceeds liquidity benefits.
V. DERIVATIVES
Derivatives are the foundation for most of the financial engineering of the last thirty-five years. Valuation and risk metrics for deriva96. Baron, Brogaard & Kirilenko, supra note 67.
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tives involve devilishly complex mathematics, but their structure is
97
98
relatively straightforward. One need not be a quant to understand
99
how they work and how they affect the efficiency of capital markets.
A. Basic Properties of Derivatives.
As a threshold matter, it is essential to understand a few basic
principles underlying derivatives. Financial institutions consistently
describe derivatives in language that is designed to make them appear
100
Derivatives are characterized
benign to customers and regulators.
101
as financial products that reduce risk. This facile description is par102
A new and more accurate
roted by academics and policymakers.
description is badly needed.
The fundamental characteristic of a derivative is that it is a bilateral contract between two parties, requiring performance in the fu103
ture. It is not an asset like a share of stock or a barrel of oil. An existing derivative is not sold to another party. If a derivative
counterparty wants to eliminate the derivative price risk from its book,
it must enter into a contract that is the same, but take on the opposite
104
obligations. The new opposite-way derivative offsets the first deriva105
tive, but only if the party on the other side performs its obligations.
The value to a counterparty of a derivative on any given day during its life involves two central properties of the contract: (1) The ex-

97. Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance
Into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1027 (1994).
98. See Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 338–39 (1989) (noting that financial
institutions have become the domain of Ph.D.s, giving them the title “quants”).
99. See Waldman, supra note 97, at 1027 (noting the conceptual simplicity of derivatives).
100. See Steve Denning, Big Banks & Derivatives: Why Another Financial Crisis Is Inevitable,
FORBES (Jan. 8, 2013, 6:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/01/08/
five-years-after-the-financial-meltdown-the-water-is-still-full-of-big-sharks/ (noting that Wells
Fargo hid derivatives behind benign labels).
101. See Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 681 (describing derivatives as “financial products”).
102. Bernard J. Karol, An Overview of Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 195, 196 (1995); Peter S. Goodman, Taking a Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at A1.
103. See Feder, supra note 101, at 691 (explaining the structure of derivatives).
104. Another method of eliminating risk is to “cash settle” the transaction. Michael
Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole with Legislative Sunlight: DoddFrank’s Attack on Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused by an Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar
Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 130 (2011).
105. The party is still subject to the risk that other party’s default will render them unable to meet their obligations. Feder, supra note 101, at 689.
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pected financial value of the performance in the future by the other
party to the contract; and (2) the likelihood that the required performance by the other party will not occur and that the expected financial value will not be realized. The values of these properties can
be, and typically are, measured independently. Measurement of these
values and how they interact, even for a simply structured derivative, is
106
a complex task.
A swap is a type of derivative contract to exchange one value for
another, the value most often being the price of a security or other
107
Swaps are structured on hundreds of
asset (the referenced asset).
different prices, including prices of equity shares, currencies, energy
and agricultural commodities, precious and commercial metals, and
108
debt.
109
A forThe basic building blocks of swaps are forward prices.
ward price, as of any date, is the expected price of a referenced asset
on a specified date in the future. The expectation is represented by
other recent contracts on the same forward price, an agreed index, or
sometimes even an estimate by one of the parties to the contract. For
example, a simple oil price swap is based on the forward price assuming a future delivery date and location and a quantity. A common
contract might refer to June delivery of 100 barrels of crude oil at
Cushing, Oklahoma, a major distribution pipeline hub.
One of the values to be exchanged in the future may be fixed
110
In this case, the
and determined at the inception of the contract.
performance required of one of the parties (“Party A”) is payment of
111
a set dollar amount. This payment is calculated in our oil swap example as the market value, at the inception of the swap, of 100 barrels
of oil to be delivered in June at Cushing, Oklahoma. If the current
forward price for a barrel of oil to be delivered in June is $100, a swap
on 100 barrels of oil would require a fixed payment by Party A in June
of $10,000.
At least one of the values to be paid under a swap is an amount
112
based on a price to be determined definitively in the future. In our
106. Sanjeev Arora et al., Computational Complexity and Information Asymmetry in Financial
Products 1 (Princeton Univ. Dep’t. of Comp. Sci., Working Paper, 2012), available at
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~rongge/derivative.pdf.
107. Greenberger, supra note 104, at 132.
108. Feder, supra note 101, at 681; Karol, supra note 102, at 200–04.
109. Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Alternative?, 5
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN & COM. L. 273, 297 (2011).
110. Greenberger, supra note 104, at 132.
111. Id.
112. See Feder, supra note 101, at 691–706 (giving an overview of derivatives).
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example, the other party to the oil price swap (“Party B”) is required
to pay an amount in June equal to the then current price of 100 barrels
of oil delivered at Cushing. Thus, the values exchanged on performance of the contract are the forward price for oil delivered in June
at inception and the actual price for oil delivered in June.
For Party A, the realized financial value of the future performance of Party B depends on the delivery price in June. If that price
is higher than the forward price at inception of the swap (Party A’s
fixed payment obligation), the swap will have a positive value for Party
A equal to the excess. If it is lower, the swap will have a negative value
to Party A equal to the amount the price has gone down since inception. Party B’s value in each of these cases will be the inverse. To put
numbers on it, remember the example in which the June forward
price of oil was $100 per barrel at the inception of the swap, resulting
in a fixed payment by Party A of $10,000. If the price per barrel is
$120 on the performance date in June, Party B will be required to pay
$12,000. After netting out the fixed payment by Party A, Party B is out
$2000, which is also the benefit to Party A. But if the price is $80 per
barrel, Party B will receive, and Party A will pay, $2000 on a net basis.
On each date prior to the definitive determination of the floating
payment (Party B’s performance obligation), the accrued value of the
swap is based on the forward price on that date. Thus, the dynamic
value of any derivative is dependent on the movement of a referenced
forward price over a specified time period.
Assuming that the fixed payment (made by Party A) is accurately
based on the June Cushing forward price at inception, the swap initially has no intrinsic financial value. At inception, the expected
amount to be paid by Party B is the same as the fixed amount to be
paid by Party A. As soon as June Cushing forward price changes,
however, value accrues. If the price increases the very next day after
inception by $1, Party A accrues that positive value; if it decreases by
$1, the accrued positive value is Party B’s. The counterparty in each
case accrues an equal negative value.
But, in contrast with this accrued value, the realized financial value is not actually known until performance is completed. The swap is
113
a contract that has realized value only if the other party performs. It
is not an asset that can be converted to cash by selling it on a date
chosen by the owner. If Party A accrues a $1 value for each barrel,
that value is at risk if Party B goes bankrupt or otherwise fails to per-

113. If, for example, Party B defaults and is unable to meet his obligations to pay, then
Party A realizes nothing.
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form. Party A is exposed to the credit of Party B. Party A can replace
the swap immediately if Party B goes bankrupt. But the replacement
swap will have a new inception date and, on that date, the June forward price is $1 higher in our example. Therefore, the fixed payment
is based on a $1 higher price for 100 barrels. The consequence to
Party A when June comes around is $100 worse.
This consequence of insolvency of Party B prior to performance
is exactly the same as if Party A had loaned $100 to Party B and then
Party B went bust. Party A has extended credit to Party B. That is exactly how sophisticated market participants, like banks, view swaps.
This view illustrates the second embedded property of a swap
that determines its value. At any time the swap has a financial value
based on the current forward price; but it also involves an extension
114
of credit that has a separate value or cost. In a loan, this value and
cost is expressed as an interest rate. In a derivative, the credit extension has a parallel value or cost, but it its expression is obscured because it is embedded in the pricing of the swap. For example, the
floating leg of the swap may be the June Cushing price less fifty cents.
This means that the swap has intrinsic value that compensates Party A
for the potential extension of credit to Party B. Sophisticated derivatives counterparties price in potential credit extension using complex
statistics, especially if they have market power to demand it.
B. Valuation of Cost of Derivatives to Capital Intermediation.
Capital intermediation is the process of matching available in115
Misvestment funds with productive uses of capital investment.
matches can be based on supply and demand. But, there are other
mismatches that arise from particular needs of investors and businesses and governments.
Derivatives are an integral part of the intermediation provided by
116
trading markets. In theory, they reconcile mismatches between capital sources and uses, typically interest rate, creditworthiness, and currency differentials. They act just like bank capital reserves in the
commercial bank intermediation model.
For example, a company or government can enter into a derivative, contract with a bank to synthetically convert the form of an obligation into another form. Using derivatives, an investor who seeks a
114. See Feder, supra note 101, at 687 (explaining that credit risk exposure is an inevitable consequence of entering into a derivative).
115. Turbeville, supra note 1.
116. Id.
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ten-year, fixed rate bond denominated in Euros can be a source of
funds for a company seeking a floating rate loan denominated in U.S.
dollars. The company can synthetically convert the bond that the investor wants to buy into funding based on terms that the company
wants to procure.
In our example, the company enters into a swap contract with a
bank. Under the contract, the company receives payments equal to
its fixed rate interest payment obligation and it pays the bank an
amount equal to the interest obligation that it would have had if the
interest obligation had been at a floating rate. The investor is paid its
fixed rate interest indirectly by the bank and the company pays floating amounts to the bank. The company’s obligations denominated in
Euros are similarly swapped with the bank for a like obligation denominated in U.S. dollars. Capital intermediation has been achieved
and the mismatches have been reconciled. The question is whether it
has been achieved more or less efficiently than would be the case if
alternatives had been used.
117
They are contracts that exDerivatives do not eliminate risk.
change one set of future consequences from a price change for an118
other, assuming the other party performs. Picture a business whose
profit and loss during a period in the future depends on price movements of a commodity or security. To avoid the consequences of an
adverse price move, the business could establish a reserve from borrowings or earnings. Alternatively, it could enter into a swap that (assuming performance by the counterparty) fixes the consequence of
this price exposure at the current price level.
The distinctions between these alternatives—capital reserves and
derivatives—should drive the decision between these two methods of
managing the risk of price movement. It is similar to the decision between buying insurance and self-insuring. The structural differences
between the two alternatives have been found to be relatively small
(though the cited study fails to consider important risks that are em119
If a reserve is used, the business must pay
bedded in derivatives).
for the capital to fund it. If a swap is used, the company pays the value of a beneficial price move if it occurs plus embedded charges. If a
reserve is used, the risk is that an adverse price move has consequenc117. Id. at 683.
118. See supra Part VI.A.
119. Andrea Gamba & Alexander J. Triantis, Corporate Risk Management: Integrating Liquidity, Hedging, and Operating Policies 2 (Robert H. Smith School, Research Paper No. RHS
06-106, 2011), available at http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/cfp/pdfs_docs/papers/Triantis
CorporateRiskMgmt.pdf.
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es beyond the reserve. If a swap is used, the basic risk is that the
counterparty fails to perform, but swaps involve many other risks as
120
well.
The relative profitability of derivatives is legendary. In 2007, I
made a proposal to the head of an energy division of one of the largest banks in the world whose responsibilities included lending to energy companies. The bank had allocated a large amount of credit capacity for certain companies to its derivatives desk. I suggested that
the bank transfer some of the credit capacity for certain energy companies to the lending group. This would enable the companies to use
loan proceeds to collateralize derivatives credit exposures to the bank
rather than merely grow exposures organically by transacting derivatives. The collateralization would be done through a system my company had developed to increase the efficiency of derivatives credit risk
management. If the bank charged uniformly for the extension of
credit, it would be indifferent as to the allocation of the credit capacity since the exposure to the bank would be the same. Under my proposal, the exposure would be under a loan and the derivatives exposure would be fully collateralized with treasury securities. Therefore,
the aggregate exposure would be the same. It appeared to be a matter of form rather than substance, but the customer would benefit
from the increased risk management efficiency my company would
provide.
The derivatives desk refused to re-allocate the credit capacity because the bank explained that its profit from credit extension embedded in derivatives was ten times the profit that could be earned from
making a loan. This experience confirmed what was commonly un121
derstood to be true. Because the pricing of derivatives was so complex, customers almost never understood how much a bank charged
122
for entering into the derivative. Assuming that this price disparity is
accurate, the price for credit embedded in a derivative would be ten
times the price for a loan to fund a reserve. The amount extracted by
the financial sector is ten times more than the same lending transaction.

120. See Feder, supra note 101, at 721–31 (explaining the risks inherent in swaps).
121. Frontline, Money, Power and Wall Street, Part One (PBS television broadcast Apr. 24,
2012), available at http://video.pbs.org/video/2226666502. The transcript for this broadcast is available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financialcrisis/money-power-wall-street/transcript-19/.
122. See Louise Story, A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Derivatives Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 2010, at A1 (explaining that customers are unaware of how much they are being
charged for entering into a derivative agreement).
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This practice constitutes a massive distortion of the credit markets. In an efficient market, credit is priced similarly regardless of
how it is deployed. Credit capacity is finite. The companies and governments seeking capital financing are constrained when available
capacity is depleted. The large disparity in the profitability of lending
and derivatives credit extension means that the businesses and governments will be prevented from tapping into capital lending sources
or will pay more for scarcer capacity. It would be different if the credit extension were ten times more valuable to the company or government than a loan. Academic research suggests, however, that this is
not the case, especially when the research is read in the context of the
123
practical use of derivatives in the marketplace.
Despite their enormous relative cost, companies and governments still use derivatives to hedge risks. Sometimes derivatives are
used to obscure the truth from others. That was the case with the
government of Greece, which entered in to an off-market swap with
credit extended by the bank at inception to meet the European Union debt ratios. But far more often, the complexity of derivatives
hides their true cost from the companies and governments that use
them. A study by Gamba & Triantis, while the most comprehensive
available, nonetheless fails to master the incredible complexity of
124
even a relatively simple swap transaction, illustrating clearly that derivatives are difficult to value. More complex derivatives are even
more challenging as additional risks compound the valuation problem. It is completely unrealistic to believe that participants in the derivatives markets accurately value the transactions that they enter into.
A recent study describes this problem:
The practical downside of using derivatives is that they are
complex assets that are difficult to price. Since their values
depend on complex interaction of numerous attributes, the
issuer can easily tamper derivatives without anybody being
able to detect it within a reasonable amount of time. Studies
suggest that valuations for a given product by different sophisticated investment banks can be easily 17% apart and
that even a single bank’s evaluations of different tranches of
125
the same derivative may be mutually inconsistent.

123. Gamba & Triantis, supra note 119, at 4.
124. Id.
125. Arora et al., supra note 106 (citations omitted).
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Under these conditions, it is clear that the very complexity of valuation of derivatives constitutes a major inefficiency in the intermediation of capital sources and capital uses.
The inadequate valuation of derivatives imposes inefficiencies
and costs on the intermediation of capital in the financial markets
and contributes to the increased cost of intermediation observed by
126
Sophisticated banks understand valuation far
Professor Philippon.
127
better than their customers, a major asymmetry of information. In
this way, the financial sector extracts value from the financial markets
through derivatives prices that are rarely understood by customers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The evaluation of the costs and benefits of limiting human activity through regulation is an ongoing and important discussion. When
the activity is commercial, the discourse is subject to a bias that restricting activity reduces productivity in the economy to the detriment
of wealth creation. When a politician says that a rule is “unduly burdensome,” he means that the discernible benefits do not outweigh the
wealth that would be created if the rule did not exist. Today, the most
sophisticated and powerful articulation of this concerns the regulation of the financial markets through financial markets reform under
existing and potential future legislation.
This debate suffers from preconceptions that rely on unfounded
economic theory and misconceptions based on the sheer complexity
of modern finance. The first challenge is to establish how to measure
the value of a market structure that is defined by a given set of regulations. The best measure looks to the structure’s value to society. The
primary function of financial markets in this context is the intermediation of capital investment. If capital intermediation is efficient in a
construct, the rent extracted by the financial sector for facilitating
that function should be proportionate to the value added.
The evidence shows that this is not the case. The predominant
approach that emphasizes the cost of individual financial transactions
is clearly inadequate. The leading theory implicitly assumes that capital intermediation can be viewed as a linear path of a unit of investment from an investor to a productive use. In this view, the costs of
individual transactions along the way determine the cost of the capital
intermediation process.

126. Philippon, Less Efficient?, supra note 55.
127. Story, supra note 122.
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This is naïve or intentionally misleading. Modern capital and derivatives markets are exceedingly complex and involve multiple methods for extraction of value by the financial sector that must be paid
for by the productive economy. The amount extracted is demonstrably far higher than historic data or reasoned analysis suggests could
possibly be reasonable. The rents extracted by the financial sector for
intermediating capital investment are inefficiently high.
The cause of this inefficiency is asymmetric information. The financial sector is incentivized to promote complexity to maximize the
value of information asymmetry. A byproduct is increased risk of catastrophic financial crises.
The costs and benefits of financial market regulation should not
be biased by the assumption that the restriction of activities is a burden that must be offset by legitimate benefits such as safety and
soundness of the system or even price transparency. Under this approach, regulations that reduce complexity or market power do not
prohibit the financial system from providing its essential social function, but very likely enhance the efficiency of that process.

